Abstract: This article challenges the claim that monetary policy neglect was responsible for the unprecedented UK inflation of the 1970s. It departs from the historiography by showing the Bank of England following money supply objectives from 1971, two years earlier than is currently acknowledged and five years before Denis Healey first published a money supply target.
New Approach swept all of these away. Henceforth, bank lending would be controlled on the basis of cost i.e. through interest rates. Loans would be granted to those companies and individuals that could pay the highest rate, rather than to those that fulfilled the authorities' qualitative criteria within the overall quantitative restrictions previously imposed on the banks. By allocating bank credit solely on the basis of cost, CCC replaced years of credit rationing 'by control'. Out went the restrictions on lending to less-favoured sectors and ceilings on bank advances that had been a feature of British banking for much of the post-war era. In came the 'interest rate weapon' -more active use of Bank Rate to control the demand-for-money.
In the recent official history of the Bank of England (the 'Bank'), Forrest Capie identifies three strands behind CCC: dissatisfaction with lending controls; a desire for more competition within banking; and a renewed emphasis on controlling monetary growth. He prioritises the first two, arguing that:
it was 1976 when something drastic needed to be done and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financing was needed and the knowledge that this time the IMF would demand determined action on containing monetary growth before serious attention to monetary targets took place 9 This article agrees that the catalyst for reform was Bank frustration with controls and its preference for a more competitive banking system. However, these were longstanding concerns that had already generated a number of unsuccessful proposals for monetary reform. 10 In 1971, the Bank believed it had identified a stable demandfor-money function in the UK and that it could control monetary growth by manipulating interest rates. This gave officials the intellectual confidence to sweep away the post-war system of controls and focus on the money supply instead. This was clearly acknowledged at the time by officials, practitioners and academics. The
Governor announced in 1972 that, 'I accept, as most central bankers would, that control of the money supply is my principal, if not my most important, concern'.
11
The influential City analyst, Gordon Pepper of W. Greenwell & Co., informed his clients at the launch of CCC that 'the main emphasis will be placed on attempting to 9 Capie, 2010, p. 645 ', 1972, Cambridge, Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter 'Churchill'), Churchill College, THCRAS 3/17. control the domestic money supply '. 12 And, as Brian Griffiths, one of the leading British monetarists of the day, pointed out: 'the intention of the new system is to move away from control of bank lending to control of one of "the broader monetary aggregates"'. 13 After outlining the transition towards M3 objectives before 1971, this article analyses the normative consequences of the New Approach for three of the four monetary policy instruments identified by Thomas Saving in 1967 : the discount rate; bank reserves; and operations in the government debt markets.
14 This early experiment was not a success. The unpublished M3 objective for 1972/3 was twenty percent. The outturn was thirty-one percent. By the time CCC was de facto abandoned in December 1973, M3 had grown by seventy-two percent.
Two years later, inflation hit a record twenty-seven percent, apparently vindicating
Friedman's claim that excess monetary growth led inexorably to higher prices after a long and variable lag. The Thatcher government, far more committed to (by then published) targets, experienced similar difficulty in hitting its monetary objectives.
The target range for £M3 in 1980/1 was 7-11 percent; the outturn was eighteen percent. Treasury Ministers invoked Goodhart's Law, which states that 'any monetary aggregate ceases to be reliable the moment it becomes a target for policy purposes'. to protect British amour propre there had to be some pretence that we, in the UK, had thought up this wonderful new wheeze, rather than had it foisted upon us, out of weakness, by the IMF.
26
The Radcliffe Report had stressed that the demand-for-money was unstable since its analogue, the velocity of circulation, was potentially infinite. 27 11, 1971, pp. 195-98. ranging reserve asset ratio. 44 Within the Treasury, the next practical consideration was the construction of the autumn 1971 financial forecasts. Before CCC, the Bank had framed a set of interest rate assumptions which were incorporated into both the financial forecasts and the thrice-yearly National Income Forecasts. The Treasury outlined the implications of following a money supply objective:
following the 'New Approach' it was decided to define the 'thrust' of monetary policy in terms of an assumed growth in money supply, instead of an assumed level of interest rates. This is conceptually a better approach, since it enables changes in the forecast of national income to be reflected in interest rates rather than silently being accommodated by an increase in money supply.
what the money supply objective should be. Since the 1971 Budget represented the last Ministerial pronouncement on monetary policy, the forecasters chose to 'take at face value the government's pronouncements' and fall back on the three percent quarterly 'guideline' derived from the demand-for-money equations and announced by Barber in March.
50
There was some unease amongst Treasury officials at the emphasis being placed on the Bank's equations:
to derive the implications for interest rates we had in the course of the forecast to place much more reliance than many of us would have wished on a reversed form of the Bank's demand-for-money equations. 
II
The Conservatives outlined the philosophy behind the dash for growth before the 1970 election:
slow growth is both a cause and consequence of our problems. It is slow growth which both erodes the incentive to invest and makes it difficult for us to afford the level of investment needed for the future…The objective of tax reform and of our economic policy as a whole is to create conditions for a faster growth of national income as a whole in which everyone can share. stimulus to the economy. The Bank estimated that long-term rates would have to rise by 1.5 percent to induce the public to take up the additional gilts, taking them through the politically sensitive ten-percent level. 59 The alternative was to fund the PSBR by selling more Treasury Bills to the banks. Treasury Bills were a reserve asset and this would increase the banks' lending capacity and therefore the money supply. Heath's refusal to allow higher long-term rates would mean an estimated £700 million of additional Treasury Bill issuance in 1972/3. This could take M3 growth to an unprecedented twenty percent.
60
Nervous officials tried to build in some future interest rate flexibility by imposing a money supply objective on the government:
we believe that the right course is to adopt a quantitative (but unpublished) target for money supply, and not to feel that we must at all costs hold to a certain level of interest rates…At the moment, given the present prospects for prices and the intention for output set out in the Budget, the appropriate target for money supply would be a rise of 20% in 1972/73. 61 Allen wrote to Barber on 21 March (the day of the 1972 Budget):
we recommend the adoption of a quantitative (but unpublished) target for money supply, which in the light of present forecasts and objectives we would put as a rise of 20 percent in 1972/3. With a consensus in favour of tighter monetary policy, Allen advised Barber that:
in previous submissions to the Chancellor it has been emphasised that it may be necessary for interest rates to rise if we are to hold the growth of money supply to 20% whether through restraint on the demand for credit or through sales of public sector debt outside the banking system. arguing that 'an increase in bank rate at this point in time would seem to public opinion to be a contradiction of the Government's policies for encouraging a high rate of economic growth'. 71 In the event, rates were raised on 22 June against the backdrop of the sterling crisis that saw the pound ejected from the European currency 'snake'.
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The Treasury explained:
The Chancellor saw the Prime Minister and, not without some argumentation, convinced him that Bank Rate should be raised to 6 per cent on the following day. The primary purpose was to curb the rate of increase in the money supply and so damp down inflationary pressures. The fact that the higher rate would help to remedy the weakness of sterling was a secondary consideration − almost an afterthought.
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Lest there should be any doubt, the Bank explained the hike in the September 1972 Quarterly Bulletin:
The move was seen as consistent with the official monetary policy objective of restraining the growth in money stock -which was currently very rapid -to a rate that was adequate, but not excessive, to finance a 5% annual rate of expansion in real output expected at the time of the Budget.
74
Early indications showed record monthly M3 growth of 3.5 percent in June 1972. Barber was advised that with the pound now floating 'the importance of external confidence in the new situation adds weight to the already strong domestic arguments for holding down the expansion of money supply during 1972/3 to a maximum of 20%'. 75 In a strongly worded memo, officials warned that the current rate of M3 growth was 'without precedent', and that it would add to 'inflationary psychosis'. surprised to learn how hard both the Bank and Treasury had been pushing for higher rates since late-May.
Underlying CCC was the premise that the broad money supply would be controlled with more active use of interest rates. As it became clear during 1972 that Heath would not grant officials the interest rate flexibility they felt was needed, they shifted their emphasis towards other monetary policy tools. We therefore turn to the second of Saving's instruments, bank reserves.
The New Approach introduced an industry-wide 12.5 percent reserve asset ratio.
Publicly, the ratio was intended to be both a prudential reserve of 'near money' assets for banks to meet customer withdrawals, and, with a nod to the Radcliffe Report, a mechanism to control overall liquidity in the economy. Privately, the Bank was more pragmatic:
the basic justification for this choice is that, of all the alternatives, it is the one that most closely approximates a ratio which the banks currently observe. It is, therefore, the one which the banks would themselves be most likely to agree to.
83
The question of a fixed versus variable reserve asset ratio attracted a rare Prime
Ministerial intervention during the planning stages of CCC. Heath expressed a preference for a variable ratio, while accepting that a fixed ratio supplemented by the system of variable special deposits in place since 1958 offered 'no great difference of principle'.
84
Since both the composition and the level of the reserve asset ratio remained fixed throughout, we use special deposits as a proxy for changing bank reserve requirements.
Special deposits were designed to rein in lending to the private sector by requiring the commercial banks to post a percentage of their gross advances at the Bank until the period requiring restraint was over. Since special deposits had to be paid in cash, the banks, when faced with a call, would tend to sell down non-reserve assets, principally gilts. Rising gilt yields would then increase the cost of borrowing throughout the economy. The banks resented the 'tax' implied by their receiving the Treasury Bill rate on special deposits held at the Bank, rather than the more lucrative commercial rates available in the market, so the Bank preferred simply to raise Bank Rate. However, Ministerial unwillingness to sanction higher interest rates after July the most direct means of influencing the lending resources available of the banks was by squeezing their reserve ratios through a call for special deposits, and there was a strong case for making a call to get the message across that the rate of growth of bank lending should be slowed down.
86
However, the gilt market was still in fragile condition after the June currency crisis, and a call for special deposits might simply encourage further selling, forcing a politically unacceptable rise in Bank Rate to keep it in line with wholesale rates.
Officials were unable to recommend a call for special deposits until the switch from Bank Rate to MLR in October 1972. On 11 October, the Chancellor was informed that:
The Bank's current view is that if the provisional estimate of a 2.25% increase in money supply in banking September is confirmed, a call of 1% should be recommended.
87
Once again, politics intervened. The talks with the TUC and CBI were ongoing, and while monetary officials were attempting to deal with the inflationary consequences of excessive monetary growth by recommending calls for special deposits, the government was edging toward a statutory prices and incomes policy. The situation was summarised by a Treasury official: a favourable outcome from the Chequers talks could lead to big sales of gilts: on the other hand, if it implies a much lower rate of inflation, our target for money supply will need to be well below 20%.
88
The outcome, another prices and incomes policy, did not generate increased gilt sales.
With annualised M3 growth still above 20 percent, Barber announced a one-percent call of special deposits on 9 November. The former Governor, Lord Cromer, by then the call for special deposits -which in essence is rather like a raising of the reserve ratio in the US -is intended to maintain the recent progress in reducing the growth of money supply. With the government facing a heavy borrowing requirement over the remaining weeks of this year, and with the government bond market still a little hesitant, there was a danger that the reserve base of the banks might be unduly increased. To prevent this, a call for special deposits has been made.
89
This first call for special deposits under CCC was swiftly followed by a second, larger, call. Bank economists had reworked their equations, and advice to the Chancellor was now that 'policy should aim to bring about a slower growth (of M3), limiting the increase to not more than 15% per year'. 90 However, Barber was also trying to curb inflation with prices subsidies. This inflated the PSBR and, on prevailing policies, M3 would increase by eighteen percent. The Chancellor was therefore encouraged to 'over-call' special deposits in order to create the impression of 'resolute action' on the money supply.
91
He played to Heath's pro-European prejudices:
in the absence of further restraining action money supply is likely to grow at a rate which would carry considerable dangers for the economy and for sterlingand which would expose us to increasing criticism from our European partners, many of whom have already taken resolute action to slow down the growth of money supply.
92
Heath agreed to the largest special deposit call to date, two percent, in December 1972. It quickly became apparent that the authorities had overdone this call, as bank reserves fell below the new statutory minimum in early 1973. A swift re-release of special deposits would be politically embarrassing. The Government Broker explained:
the obvious remedy is to pay back sufficient of the Special Deposits to set the position right and apologise for having made a mistake. However, the powers that be, particularly the political ones, will not hear of it and (Fforde) says they are being run by politics against their better judgement. Before CCC, the Bank had 'leant into the wind' in the gilt market both to ensure the continued marketability of government debt and to control interest rates. The
Chief Cashier explained the rationale behind the partial withdrawal from the market in May 1971:
some time before the reappraisal of monetary policy which led up to Competition and Credit Control had been completed, the conclusion had been reached that the Bank's operations in the gilt-edged market should pay more regard to their quantitative effects on the monetary aggregates and less regard to the behaviour of interest rates.
94
The November 1971 financial forecast was the first to be predicated on a money supply objective. It started with the twelve-percent guideline for M3 implied in the March Budget, and finished with gilt sales to the public as the balancing item:
the main residual in constructing this financial forecast is gilt-edged sales to non-bank investors. We have allowed bank lending to the private sector to be effectively demand-determined, and hence, given the public sector borrowing requirement and the external flow, the figures inserted for gilt edged (or more widely, sales of public sector debt as a whole) are simply those that would be required to keep money supply to its assumed growth rate.
95
With the guideline still at twelve percent in January 1972, Barber was advised that:
for 1972/73 net sales of about £1000m of public sector debt to non-banks would be required to keep the growth of money supply at 3% a quarter. If the borrowing requirement were increased this 'target' for debt sales would also be revised.
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The new twenty-percent objective in place after the 1972 Budget required the authorities to raise their target for gilt sales. In April 1972, the Chancellor was informed that 'gilt-edged sales of about £900 million would be required we have made no significant sales since late January, and the process of buying in the next maturities has meant that on balance we have made substantial purchases of gilt edged. For the current quarter to date, we are now about £23 million down (whereas to fulfil our requirement for the year, we ought to set our sights on selling something like £200-£250 million in this quarter).
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The situation deteriorated with the June 1972 sterling crisis. The outflow of capital left the banks below the new 12.5 percent reserve requirement. The Bank arranged a sale-and-repurchase agreement, taking in £358 million of gilts in exchange for sufficient reserves to take the banks back over the ratio. 99 As Figure 1 shows, far from selling sufficient public sector debt to meet the twenty-percent M3 objective, the Bank was a net buyer of £800 million.
Figure 1. Net sales of public sector debt to the non-bank public (£ millions).
Source: Financial Statistics and Treasury financial forecasts. The data are for target and actual sales of all public sector debt.
The Bank was unwilling to meet its M3 objectives by pressing gilts onto a falling market. Dropping the price to encourage sales would mean higher rates which the Prime Minister had ruled out. In any event, the Chief Cashier did not believe that 'there is a rate of interest determinable by the authorities in abstraction from the behaviour of the market at which investors will buy gilt-edged in large quantities'.
100
Page felt that substantial sales would come only after a successful conclusion to the tripartite talks on prices and incomes with the TUC and CBI. In addition, price volatility had increased since the partial withdrawal of the Government Broker, making gilts a less-attractive investment. Nonetheless, increased gilt sales were central to the new monetary regime. Officials explained this to Barber ahead of the 1973 Budget:
with a public sector borrowing requirement of, say, £4,350 million in 1973-74, and a target growth of money supply (M3) of not more than 15%, it seemed likely that sales of public sector debt to the non-banks would need to be of the order of £3,000 million. This is a formidable objective. the Bank are planning to invest heavily in local authority deposits next week, as the need arises...the Chief Cashier is pretty confident that they will find means of getting by without a sharp increase in interest rates. He is, I think, rather enjoying the exercise and beginning to look upon it as a challenge.
The New Approach was predicated on controlling M3 through more frequent use of the interest rate weapon. When Heath ruled out higher rates in 1972, officials shifted their focus to the reserves and more flexible use of special deposits. As this tactic was, in turn, ruled out during 1973, the Bank turned to open market operations to relieve liquidity shortages, having throughout based its targets for gilt sales on objectives for the broad money supply.
IV
The retreat from the money supply experiment was long and painful. In July 1972, the Bank was already reporting 'considerable problems with the equation used to predict the demand for money'. 105 The re-worked equations indicated that M3, having already grown by 7.75 percent in the three months since the Budget, should now be restricted to seventeen percent for the year as a whole. 106 Pepper was not far from the truth when he wrote to his clients:
Recent answers by the Chancellor and Treasury Ministers to questions in Parliament confirmed that the new objective was the slow the rate of growth of the money supply from an excessive 20% per annum to a rate in line with the growth of the economy in money terms i.e. about 12½%.
107
The first hint from the Bank that all was not well came a month later with the Governor's qualitative guidance to the banks. As The Guardian pointed out:
it is only a short step from this to the thought that the Bank has recognised that the philosophy in Competition and Credit Control at least in its naked simplicity, is incompatible with the management of the economy. the monetarist edifice rests largely on the stability, and predictability, of the demand-for-money function. Econometric study of the data in the 1960s had suggested that in the UK we, too, could build parts of our monetary policy on this basis. Subsequent experience has revealed weakness in this foundation.
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The second major mistake was to assume that Ministers would allow the interest rate flexibility that the New Approach demanded. Margaret Reid suggests that 'some Ministers, it seems, afterwards felt that it had never been brought home to them that it might be necessary to raise interest rates above the then politically sensitive level of 10 per cent to get an adequate grip on a later upsurge in credit '. 115 However, as Sir Douglas Allen subsequently explained: I pointed out to (Barber) that, given the lax fiscal policy that the PM had insisted upon, a significant rise in interest rates would soon become necessary and that if he adopted the C and CC proposal he would have to agree to it. He said that he understood that and would accept rate rises if necessary.
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Barber did accept this. He informed the Prime Minister in June 1972 that:
111 Wass, 2008, p. 64. 112 Capie suggests that Hollom's speech showed 'not really much change from the old days', Capie, 2010, p. 508. 113 Private communication with Sir Douglas Wass, 16 April 2012. 114 Goodhart, 1984, p. 113. 115 Reid, 1982, p. 32. 116 Private communication with Lord Croham, 19 October 2009. under the new arrangements for competition and credit control, the main emphasis is on money supply and it has always been recognised that this will necessarily entail wider swings in interest rates than we have had in the past.
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Nonetheless, Heath failed to grasp the full implications of CCC. After refusing to raise rates in July 1972, he 'repeated his inability to understand the new system' saying that he 'distrusted the argument that higher interest rates would help us'.
118 As well as being intellectually opposed to rate rises, Heath had a number of political objections. Higher rates might choke off industrial investment. Control of the money operates through the simple but brutal means of butchering company profits. Ultimately insolvency and unemployment teach employers and workers alike that they need to behave reasonably and sensibly. 136 Confidently asserting that 'control of the money supply will over a period of years reduce the rate of inflation', Sir Geoffrey Howe laid out a four-year series of declining target ranges for £M3 in his 1980 Budget. 137 As the Permanent Secretary pointed out, the 'crux of the thesis' was 'a rational expectations approach which relied on economic agents, particularly wage bargainers, quickly adjusting to the new monetary conditions'. Niehan's advice was not politically welcome. Despite the diplomatic language in which it was couched, it advocated actions that could be seen as a public admission that the Government had done the economy a great deal of damage by mistake. 143 Lawson claims that the Niehans' report had little impact at the Treasury. 144 However, it was harder for Ministers to ignore the conclusions of a recently-completed Treasury study into the causes of inflation.
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This reaffirmed another lesson from the Competition and Credit Control era, that relationships which appeared to be established in the past do not always hold in the future:
The simple account of inflation in terms of monetary growth two years previously, which received a lot of public attention in the mid-seventies, has not stood up well to closer inspection, or to the test of time.
146
The need to retain political credibility militated against immediately abandoning the £M3 target. 
